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Introduction
Concerns about the intersection of religious extremism and politics have been focal points 
in the West since Osama bin Laden called for holy war against Western democracies in 
1996. Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, state-subsidised interfaith 
dialogue associations, often sponsored as part of political peace efforts, have since emerged 
internationally. Whereas 11 September 2001 constituted the defining event of the early war 
on terror, its later phase has been shaped around acts of violence in Europe, as evidenced 
through the focus on what is often labelled ‘home grown terrorism’ (Kundnani 2014: 8–9, 
65). To prevent the number of assumed threats from increasing, Norwegian governments 
have issued action plans against the so-called radicalisation and violent extremism. 
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Notably, while the preventive measures against violent extremism single-handedly have 
been seen as a security service task, the latest Norwegian action plan from 2014 posits 
civil society actors such as faith communities and interfaith dialogue platforms as central 
partakers within various de-radicalisation efforts (Winswold, Mjelde & Loga 2017: 7).
In contemporary Norway, de-radicalisation efforts constitute a variety of political 
measures that embrace interfaith organisations. Yet, few studies focus on how civil society 
communities navigate these, ultimately, political measures or the central media and policy 
presumptions crosscutting civil society initiatives. Additionally, no studies deal with the 
Norwegian merging of public authorities with civil society associations in the growing de-
radicalisation industry.1 The present article seeks to address this gap by exploring a de-
radicalisation seminar held in the auspices of a local branch of a nationwide and nationally 
recognised interfaith organisation, Forum for Religious and Life Stances in Kristiansand 
(Forum for Tro og Livssyn [FTL]). Doing so, the concept of governance of diversity is 
important. By governance of diversity, I refer to the social practices of addressing, 
supporting and framing ethno-religious minorities in certain ways. Dominant frames are 
remediated in a variety of social settings (for Scandinavian case studies on this topic, see 
Lundby 2018) and shape the ways in which diversity is managed in public events and in 
everyday social interactions. A fundamental theoretical premise is that frames direct our 
perception, thought and action during social and media events (Goffman 1974: 10–11) for 
which reason control and distribution of frames is a prime concern in the operation and 
analysis of governance of diversity. As framing inhabits power exertions (Entman 1993: 52), 
framing processes inadvertently bring about embedded forms of governance that can be 
analytically procured.
New approaches to governance direct attention to various modes of regulation that span 
a continuum from public authority to societal and individual self-governance. Focussing 
on the governance of minority religion and the conduct of cultural citizenship, the present 
article critically engages with how media and policy influence interreligious dialogue. 
More precisely, the article explores how FTL, a civil society association, organises a de-
radicalisation event, how Islam and Muslims are portrayed during this event and how 
media and policy frames shape the event. The article asks: what part do media and policy 
frames play in the set-up of this de-radicalisation measure and which mechanisms of 
inclusion versus exclusion does the merging of interfaith dialogue and de-radicalisation 
measures promote? By exploring this question, the article provides a micro-scale analysis of 
an instance of religious diversity management in contemporary Norway. Such governance 
perspective in combination with framing theory has hitherto not been widely used in 
studies of regulation of religious diversity (Maussen & Bader 2011: 15).
Methodologically, the study is based on participant observation during the first half of 
the two-day de-radicalisation seminar held in September 2015 and on interviews with 26 
individuals active in various interreligious forums in Norway. A total of 12 interviews were 
conducted with FTL members including one with the FTL chairman. During 2015 and 2016, 
I attended the monthly FTL public interfaith meetings and was invited by the FTL chairman 
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to attend the de-radicalisation seminar in question. Furthermore, policy documents, 
organisational documents and media representations are part of the analysis.
Interreligious dialogue in Norway
In Norway, organised interfaith work began in the 1980s and ever since the efforts have 
become more widespread and institutionalised. Even though these efforts receive public 
funding today, organised interfaith initiatives have from their inception been concerned 
with special-interest politics centred on equality between minority religions and life stance 
communities versus the now secular state and the majority church, the Lutheran Church 
of Norway (Brottveit, Gresaker & Hoel 2015: 7ff.). Today, the Council for Religious and Life 
Stance Communities (Samarbeidsrådet for tros- og livsynsamfunn [STL]) constitutes the 
most central and unifying interfaith community nationally with eight local offshoots across 
the country plus a youth network. The efforts of STL are wide ranging, and they include 
policy work and dialogue initiatives.
In 2007, the STL offshoot, FTL, was established in Kristiansand in the Vest-Agder region 
in south of Norway. FTL comprises 12 local member organisations and receives financial 
support from the municipality, county and state and by STL through annual ad hoc-funding 
applications for up-to-date initiatives such as counter-radicalisation initiatives.2 According 
to STL, its objectives are:
-	 to promote mutual understanding and respect between different religious and life 
stance communities through dialogue;
-	 to work towards equality between various religious and life stance communities in 
Norway based on the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and European 
Convention on Human Rights and
-	 to work, internally and externally, with social and ethical issues from the perspective of 
religions and life stances (Trooglivssyn.no 2017).3
Moreover the FTL and STL objectives are to enhance mutual understanding and respect 
between people, to contribute to a sense of safety and tolerance between faith and life 
stance organisations and to create awareness of ethical issues from faith and life stance 
perspectives (Trooglivssyn.no 2017).
The seminar Together against Radicalisation and Extremism organised and convened by 
FTL can roughly be categorised as a so-called political approach to interfaith dialogue (cf. 
Neufeldt 2011). One purpose of such a political approach is to produce social coexistence or 
harmony. This typically involves educating the other, and interactions often centre on social 
or political problems (Neufeldt 2011: 354) such as de-radicalisation. As was the case with the 
de-radicalisation seminar in question, religious actors convene in a high-profile manner to 
broadcast positive messages that emerge from the interaction, to address political concerns, 
etc. This approach simultaneously anticipates that religious leaders will delegitimise actors 
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who suggest that use of violence is an appropriate means to an end (cf. Neufeldt 2011), which 
as illustrated in the following also happened to be the case also happened to be the case for 
this seminar.
Speakers engaged in politically oriented dialogues are usually religious leaders as they 
are deemed credible and trusted and represent their communities in public forums.4 The 
format of exchange is a purposive ‘double monologue’ (Biljefeld 1996), that is semi-staged, 
sequenced and parallel addresses or conversations absent of any direct exchange of opinion 
with intensions of giving space in the public sphere to religious figures to state their beliefs 
to a wider audience and thereby to create knowledge about the respective faith and life 
stance communities. All addresses and conversation are held in a peaceful and patient tone 
of voice (Neufeldt 2011: 355), and as I argue elsewhere, in the case of FTL, its public meetings 
work to rehearse, perform and thus establish an acceptable form of multicultural religiosity 
(Liebmann 2017: 317–19). Regular attendants at the monthly FTL meetings are primarily 
middle aged or elderly, white citizens from middle to upper-middle class backgrounds, but, 
as seen in the following, the audience at this event was significantly younger and did not 
attend of their own accord but as part of their curricula.
Whereas the last decade has been characterised by increased focus on de-radicalisation 
measures, in 2014, the government afforded faith communities and interfaith associations 
an important part in the prevention of religious radicalisation and extremism (Winswold, 
Mjelde & Loga 2017).5 Since 2014, the Ministry of Culture has announced annual funding 
opportunities, ranging from 50,000 to 400,000 NKR, for interfaith events set to create 
mutual acceptance and respect between faith and life stance associations, promote the 
associations’ common values, explicated as democracy, rule of law and human rights, 
and prevent radicalisation (Kulturdepartementet 2014). These funding opportunities are 
consistent with the government’s Action Plan against Radicalization and Violent Extremism 
(NMJPS 2014). The plan identifies two major extremist groups in Norway, both in strong 
opposition to one another: al-Qaida-inspired extremism and anti-Islamic right-wing 
extremism.
Precisely the absorption of interfaith associations into de-radicalisation measures 
indicates the extent to which interfaith platforms are taking a leading role as policy partners 
in the governance of religious diversity in many contemporary European countries (Haynes 
2013: 8).
‘Together against Radicalisation and Extremism’
Listing which initiatives the government – and the ministry – plan to implement, the action 
plan, issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, explicitly focuses on 
youth dialogue conferences and targets a strengthening of faith and life stance dialogues 
as efforts to counter ‘radicalisation’ through Measures 5 and 15. The dialogues are meant 
to create knowledge and competence (Measure 5) and to prevent the growth of extreme 
environments and contribute to reintegration (Measure 15) (NMJPS 2014: 3). Through 
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Measures 5 and 15, the FTL-initiated seminar Together against Radicalisation and Extremism 
is an integral part of what Winswold, Mjelde & Loga (2017: 15) term ‘primary prevention 
strategies’. Being, in essence, counter-terrorism measures, primary prevention strategies 
share a broad preventive scope. As an alternative to singling out certain communities or 
citizens as particularly ‘suspect’ (Winswold, Mjelde & Loga 2017: 19ff.), the purpose of these 
efforts is to make the entire citizenry resilient against what is taken to be damaging and thus 
‘extreme’ ideas that cause, or condone, violence against Western civilians (ibid.:15). Such 
primary prevention interventions seek to reduce citizens’ risks of becoming ‘radicalised’ 
by altering their conduct or reducing their exposure to factors linked to violent acts deemed 
radical. Corresponding to this line of thought, Amir-Moazami (2011: 98–99) has suggested 
that a central motive for public funding of interfaith associations is essentially based on 
the mode of governance it constitutes. The organisations help create platforms from which 
public parties can conduct and steer minorities, especially Muslims, into moderate and 
liberal citizens of the modern nation state.
As the following section demonstrates, the merging of de-radicalisation and interfaith 
initiatives produces a certain form of inclusive religiosity, yet sustains and reinforces 
formations of severe power inequalities between ethno-religious minorities and majorities.
Islam as organising principle of radicalisation interventions
The pre-circulated official seminar programme of Together against Radicalisation and 
Extremism explicitly stated that the scope of the seminar would use the speakers’ respective 
religious affiliations (Christianity, Judaism and Islam) as starting points, address the 
cause(s) of radicalisation and extremism and the consequences of these two issues and 
discuss how society can confront – and above all – prevent such development.
With the following words, the convened FTL representative opened the de-radicalisation 
seminar at the town cinema in late 2015 to introduce the programme and the invited 
speakers:
What we do today does matter because the Norwegian society has changed. The diversity 
in our culture is reflected in our faith and life stances. It affects the entire development 
today. What we must talk about is dialogue. Of meeting each other, of conversing, 
of sharing our thoughts. That’s how we want to contribute to mutual understanding 
between people.
Three different presentations were given by speakers who represented Christianity, Islam 
and Judaism, respectively, intermediated by musical features, conversations and a question 
and answer session that engaged the audience. Every year, the audience consists of local 
high school students between 15 and 19 years of age, attending the seminar as part of their 
curricula. Opening the two-and-a half-hour long seminar, the convenor told the attendees 
that FTL had asked ‘someone’ to make a short video about what local Kristiansand youth 
think of when they hear terms such as ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. The five-minute 
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long video featured youth of both sexes and different ethnicities who expressed notions of 
violent attacks, relating them to Muslims: ‘Radicalisation is, like, IS and war and violence’, 
a white teenage boy declared, while another said: ‘radicalisation is a process, which you go 
through and which is about terror, flights, and [becoming an] extremist, I think’. A young 
female put it this way: ‘Then I think about ... extreme Muslims’. Afterwards, and without 
any further elaboration of the youths’ remarks, the first presenter entered the stage to 
deliver her address. Vigdis,6 an experienced, high-ranking woman in the Lutheran Church 
of Norway who seemed at ease before the audience, began by reflecting on what it means 
to be a religious extremist. Vigdis accentuated that nothing is wrong with being strongly 
religious and that people can be ‘extremely religious’ without being violent and hurting 
other people. As was the case with most of the seminar, her presentation nonetheless soon 
centred on Islam. Speaking against literal readings of Christianity and religious texts in 
general, Vigdis elaborated:
In the Old Testament, we read about how God is able to help the Israelis with killing 
thousands of enemies. Thus, God sides with the contenders. That is quite problematic 
and we have many texts on violence in the Bible, which are at least as violent as those 
you find occasionally in the Quran. We do not talk much about this but there is [in the 
texts] a germ for using [the] texts – completely outside their contexts – to say that I am 
right, and God is on my side.
While the scope of this part of Vigdis’ presentation was to stress the problem with 
fundamentalist expounding of religious texts per se, including within Christianity, she 
quickly turned to mention the Quran as another instance of a religious text that contains 
violence. Although Vigdis duly attempted not to exaggerate the violence mentioned in the 
Quran, as opposed to violence referenced in the Bible, the fact that the Quran, and thereby 
Islam, was, in fact, referred to in this passage is quite telling. Reflecting on the violent 
history of Christianity and processes of radicalisation, she proceeded:
If we look to those who are recruited to [do] extreme actions and to [do] violence, then 
it is often about young people who for different reasons have failed, who are lonely, 
[have] dropped out of school, [are] unemployed, semi-criminals. And then they find an 
environment or friends in part of the extreme religious environment. As such, they do 
not become violent because they become Muslims, but because they befriend Muslims 
who are violent and criminals. Thus, to begin with, it has nothing at all to do with Islam.
Again, Vigdis used instances of so-called Muslim extremism when exemplifying the 
social reasons behind recruitment to religious extremism and violence: feelings of failure, 
loneliness, school drop-out, unemployment and criminality. While Vigdis reflected on the 
general social mechanisms that can make people prone to being attracted to the ‘extreme 
religious environment[s]’ and to carry out violent attacks, she nevertheless pointed 
specifically to Muslims in her efforts to concretise the radicalisation process itself. Thus, 
Unauthentifiziert   | Heruntergeladen  28.10.19 15:40   UTC
389
in the advancement from an elaboration on the generic and slide towards the particular, 
Vigdis draws in Islam. Although she explicitly disassociates Muslims from automatically 
being connected with terrorist attacks, the very mention − repeatedly − of Muslims in the 
context of religious extremism nonetheless implies quite the opposite.
Elsewhere, I have suggested calling such routine fusion of Muslims with violence 
and terrorism for ‘banal securitization of Islam’ (Liebmann 2018: 194). The concept 
‘securitization of Islam’ (Cesari 2013) refers to the central rhetorical tropes, partly induced 
by the media, which portray Muslims as threats to national security in Western societies. 
Furthermore, as discerned by Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking (2011: 275), securitisation is 
also an everyday phenomenon and ‘banal securitization’ refers to the everyday practices 
in which issues or people are categorised in stereotypical terms in response to macro-scale 
events with local implications. Importantly, through these processes, group as well as 
individual subjectivities become securitised (ibid.). Thus, ‘banal securitization of Islam’ 
refers to the way in which Muslim citizens, in Norway and beyond, are, on a daily basis, 
rendered as potentially suspicious by being demarcated and stigmatised (Morey & Yaqin 
2011). As I shall return to in the following, the media and policy framings play a significant 
part in these presumptions crosscutting the seminar.
Following Vigdis’s presentation was the Islamic representative, Farwa, from the Islamic 
Council of Norway (Islamisk Råd Norge [IRN]), a Muslim umbrella organisation. An equally 
stage- and media-savvy male Farwa began his talk by briefly introducing IRN and then 
progressed to his PowerPoint presentation, a tool kit that he used as a point of reference 
for his ensuing talk. The PowerPoint presentation featured mainly pictures of famous and 
infamous people such as Osama bin Laden and people identified as members of Profetens 
Ummah, a salafi-jihadi organisation based in Norway, primarily known through media. The 
presentation also contained visuals of contemporary and historical sites of terrorist attacks 
such as the Twin Towers of New York. Departing from his own childhood in Oslo in the 
1980s, Farwa continued on to the events of 11 September 2001. Meticulously, and to much 
amusement from the audience, Farwa (re)told the story about how he, during a work-related 
stay abroad in July 2011, through his cousin came to know about the bombings in Oslo. On 
22 July 2011, far-right, white and then self-proclaimed Christian Anders Breivik bombed the 
government buildings in central Oslo and attacked a Worker’s Youth League camp on the 
island of Utøya killing 77 civilians in total. Farwa detailed how his cousin, who worked in 
the government buildings, had him contacting the Norwegian Police Security Service before 
they officially were aware of the events, thus hinting at how he suddenly found himself 
looking suspicious, as he was calling them with what would seem retrieved intelligence still 
unfamiliar to authorities. This part clearly evoked laughter from the audience members. 
Elaborating on the rather awkward situation – and intermittently joking about having four 
children and three wives – Farwa was met by loud outbursts of laughter.
Addressing Profetens Ummah, Farwa then proceeded to show a picture of Islamic 
clad Imams playing beach volleyball with Norwegian police. Farwa then proceeded with 
mentioning a group of Imams who were involved with IRN to ‘learn to cooperate’. He 
continued to address ‘extremists’ involved with IRN and stressed that, during the preceding 
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five years and onwards, ‘their Muslim extremists’ were being ‘met directly’ by IRN, ‘with 
respect and through dialogue’. Interestingly, Farwa did not mark out any theological 
standpoints during his presentation, besides distancing IRN from religiously justified 
violence, and mainly reflected on discrimination against Muslims, exemplified through a 
Norwegian born and raised, well-educated Muslim unable to find work.
Farwa’s sequence was the only part in which a speaker triggered direct and immediate 
response from the audience. The young audience members from different high schools in the 
Kristiansand area were confined to speak in a limited series of short question and answer 
sessions and simply raised questions and concerns that seemed prepared in advance. This 
way, their outbursts of laughter constituted a noticeable break from the otherwise serious 
content matter, and the laughter was a welcomed reaction to Farwa’s diversions. As I shall 
return to later, Farwa’s demeanour and applied tool of humour are embedded in the context 
of the post-cartoon crisis, which erupted in Denmark in 2005, after which an increasing 
curiosity about Muslims and their (supposed lack of) humour has created a demand for 
Muslim self-irony (Bilici 2010: 196).
The Jewish representative Anna was the next presenter. Anna was not affiliated with 
any religious organisation. She was invited to represent this world religion due to her Jewish 
descent and because she had recently premiered a documentary on a hitherto untold story 
about a Jewish foster home prior to World War II . Because Anna was booked for the seminar 
at the last minute, her session began with a conversation between her and the convenor and 
a short preview of her film.7 Opening the session with Anna, the convenor enquired about 
the documentary’s premiere date and proceeded:
Yes, that is fascinating [referring to the documentary]. Those things happened a long 
time ago, at least before I was born. Do you see – as we are talking about Islamisation 
and radicalisation and extremism – does tabooing of Jews happen today in Norway as 
well?
Although Islam and the acts of Muslims did indeed play a significant part in the seminar, up 
until this point no one had yet spoken of ‘Islamisation’: the process of a societal shift towards 
Islam. The abrupt insertion of the term ‘Islamisation’ reveals the improvised nature of (part 
of) the seminar content and illustrates the ad hoc planning in terms of invited presenters 
and evoked subthemes. The sudden introduction of the term is therefore probably a slipup 
on part of the convenor who is obviously not well versed in the terminology pertaining to 
mediatised conflicts of religion (Abdel-Fadil & Liebmann 2018). Yet, such ad hoc elements 
also indicate which terms and tropes circulate in the society in relation to a given issue. 
Precisely the term ‘Islamisation’ constitutes a central trope in far-right circles across 
Europe. In the Christian conservatively Vest-Agder region where the seminar took place, 
Islamophobia has long been known to proliferate (Bangstad 2016). For example, some of 
the country’s most well-known anti-Muslim advocates are based there such as Vidar Kleppe 
who co-founded the political party The Democrats (Demokraterne) and Arne Tumyr, the 
former leader of the organisation Stop The Islamisation of Norway (Stopp Islamiseringen av 
Norge [SIAN]).8 As demonstrated through its name, SIAN opposes so-called ‘Islamisation’ 
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and what the organisation argues are Muslims’ attempts to introduce sharia in Norway 
(ibid.: 155–156).
At this point, the convenor turned the conversation towards the recent and violent 
events in the European cities, Paris and Copenhagen, referencing how ‘the whole of Europe 
went around saying: “Je suis Charlie”’.9 This part clearly marked a prepared point that 
served as an entry point for Anna to convey the jewellery she had (co)produced, partly, as 
a reaction to the attacks in Paris – jewellery worn to symbolise cross-religious coexistence. 
After disclosing how the idea of the jewellery emerged and responding to several follow-up 
questions, the convenor directly requested Anna to pose a question to each of the other 
two presenters. Anna, then, enquired whether Vigdis and Farwa would be willing to wear 
her jewellery. Visibly glad and seeming relieved to hear both of them answer ‘yes’, she 
elaborated:
And I will make no secret of the fact that, to me, the biggest dream is that all young 
Muslims will wear it. And perhaps even more: young male Muslims. And even more 
those young Muslims who for many understandable reasons feel marginalised and 
therefore are likely to become extreme.
Although the seminar’s headline and subject matter was that of religious extremism and 
radicalisation per se, represented by, and through, three different representatives of the 
major world religions, the content was repeatedly modified towards Islam. The perpetual 
reference to the Salafi jihadist militant group IS (Islamic State), acts of Muslims, the Quran, 
recent attacks in Europe by declared Muslims, Muslims as the major beneficiaries of cross-
religious coexistence and even the explicit mentioning of ‘Islamisation’ as an existing topic 
within the seminar’s programme content all thematise Islam. This way, Islam and Muslims 
came to constitute a focal point around which the entire event revolved. The convenor, the 
presenters and even the anonymous person behind the introductory video, and the young 
people in it, shared this line of view. As I shall get back to in the following, such – even 
unwilling – attention to a certain phenomenon is termed framing.
Media’s depictions of Muslims in and outside Norway
Unquestionably, mass media have become the primary source of information and 
communication for the majority of modern societies. Likewise, regarding religion, mass 
and social media constitute the prime supplier of information and communication for 
Scandinavian citizens (Hjarvard & Lövheim 2012; Lövheim et al. 2018). The relation between 
the media vis-à-vis culture, social life and politics is important as media brings about dual 
functions, reflecting and shaping issues occurring within these three domains (Eskjær, 
Hjarvard & Mortensen 2015; Hepp, Hjarvard & Lundby 2015). Departing from frame theory 
as developed by Erving Goffman (1974), Robert Entman (1993: 52) characterised framing as 
a way to describe how communicative ‘texts’ exercise power. Framing involves processes 
of selection and salience by different agents to promote problem definitions, causal 
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interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation for the phenomenon 
described (ibid.: 52). The selection and deployment of frames in the coverage of a given 
issue structures and influences how readers and audiences come to think of the issues in 
question. That is, frames are essential not only to formations of identity but also to how 
people interact with each other as social interaction tends to occur around prescribed and 
prestructured formations. Consequently, the ways in which Muslims’ conduct are mediated 
to a wide audience can be taken to influence the social interaction around these issues as 
shown in several studies on Islam in Norway (Alghamdi 2015; Bangstad 2011; Døving 2012; 
Es 2017).
When it comes to religion featured in mass media, debate material on Islam such as 
opinion pieces has replaced the everyday mentioning of Christianity and the latter’s roles 
and values within the society (Michelsen 2016: 7). The same pattern may appear in social 
media (Herbert 2018). Correspondingly, a recent cross-national comparative survey (cf. 
Lövheim et al. 2018) shows that in 2015, 47 percent of the Norwegian respondents perceived 
Islam as a threat to ‘Norwegian culture’, whereas, for instance, only 12 percent thought of 
Judaism and 8 percent of Christianity in such terms (Lundby 2017: 8). The survey supports 
the notion that Islam is overrepresented in the media compared to the relatively low number 
of Muslims living in Norway (Lövheim et al. 2018) − estimates suggest around 4 percent 
of residents identify as Muslims. More importantly, the findings indicate a widespread 
tendency of associating Islam with tensions and illustrate how mediatised far-right 
discourses on what is perceived to be essential cultural differences have influenced the 
population (cf. Fangen & Kolås 2016: 421; Mårtensson 2014: 238).
When frames govern: Islam and Muslims as elephants in the 
interfaith room
As pointed out earlier, Islam and Muslims constitute a focal point to which the convenor 
and the presenters relate. Similarly, and in several ways, the high school students in 
the introductory video instinctively associated the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘religious 
extremism’ with Islam as they mentioned ‘IS’ and ‘radical Muslims’. Statements which − 
considering the more religiously inclusive programme scope − the convenor failed to address. 
Even when one presenter, Vigdis, explicitly elaborated on ‘extremists’ tendencies within 
Christianity, talked elaborately on social mechanisms of exclusion and marginalisation 
leading to radicalisation and explicitly spoke against prejudices against Muslims in an 
attempt to avoid reproducing stereotypes, she nonetheless referred to Islam at key moments 
in her talk. Moreover, Vigdis mentioned the Quran when speaking about religious texts that 
call for violence, and to concretise the radicalisation process itself, she exemplified Muslims 
as people from ‘extreme religious environments’.
As it seemed necessary for Vigdis to evoke Muslims as embodiments of Norwegian 
citizens who turn to violent environments to belong, it might be because, to a wide 
Norwegian audience, the induced images of Muslims as radicals constitute the very essence 
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of religious extremism and thus work as a didactic framework activated through sheer 
reference. As mentioned, images of Muslims as religious radicals constitute a well-known 
frame in Norwegian media and policy discourses (Bangstad 2011; Fangen & Kolås 2016; 
Vestel 2016). Moreover, in the public sphere, the term ‘radicalisation’ is ubiquitous and is, 
invariably, deployed in contexts of security, integration and foreign policy (Sedgwick 2010: 
484–87). Precisely, Vigdis’ struggle to explicate the term ‘radicalisation’ may be attributed 
to its ubiquitous nature. Furthermore, the convenor’s rephrasing of the topic of the seminar 
as being about ‘Islamisation’ pertains to the particular political–religious context in which 
the ubiquity of the term ‘radicalisation’ and the ‘mainstreaming of Islamophobia’ (Bangstad 
2016: 150) in political and media discourses merge.
As noted, Farwa did not mark out any notable theological standpoints during his 
presentation. Although a prominent member of IRN, he refrained from expounding any 
religious texts and discussing the content of the represented religion to any noticeable 
degree. Through recounts about his childhood memories of curious incidents with the 
Norwegian society and IRN’s work with Muslim extremists, etc., all held in a humorous tone 
of voice, Farwa deployed humour as a form of ‘code-switching’ (Bilici 2010: 207), thereby 
projecting an image of himself to the attendants as, above all, a clearly harmless and 
likeable Muslim. Not coming off as too religious, indicating disinterest in Islamic theology, 
and being unmistakeably relatable – peaceful, friendly and funny – Farwa thus came to 
personify the antidote to the Muslim stereotype. Media prototypes of Muslim men often 
see them as humour deprived and overly conservative and thereby constituting embodied 
threats to what is held to be particularly ‘Norwegian values’ (cf. Bangstad 2011) such as 
tolerance, kindness, honesty and democratic attitudes.
Through his performance, Farwa not only managed to mask what seemed as lack of 
preparation for the event in question, he equally succeeded in playing on the intricate 
relationship between Islamophobia and Muslim stereotypes through which he, fleetingly, 
re-humanised Muslims and invited the predominantly ethnically Norwegian audience to 
take part in a – apparently laughable – symbolic reversal of the social order (Bilici 2010: 
207). As such, Farwa’s use of humour works as a tool for undoing otherness when he, as 
the Muslim representative on the interfaith scene, faces the delicate task of dealing with 
the policy and media-induced topic of ‘radicalisation’. Addressing this issue is particularly 
tricky in the setting of a purportedly dialogic interfaith conversation with other non-
Muslim presenters in front of a predominantly non-Muslim audience not least given the 
repeated crisis between institutionalised interfaith associations and Norwegian Muslim 
organisations (Bangstad 2016: 438ff.).10
Put differently, in the paradoxical setting of the secular-staged interreligious event in 
a conservatively Christian region with a substantial right-wing history, humour works as 
a form of ‘comic relief’ (Abdel-Fadil 2005: 6). The term ‘comic relief’ points to how humour 
can alleviate social tensions and, thus, is applicable as a defence mechanism when coming 
to terms with an overwhelming reality (ibid.). The cost of Farwa’s move is, however, that he 
comes to sidestep the opportunity to address the misfortunate slip-ups that occur and to 
engage in any significant interchange with the other presenters. Ultimately, Farwa neither 
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challenges nor nuances the presumptions underlying the seminar, such as Muslims being 
particularly prone to violence.
Since media and politics are highly interrelated (Meyen, Thieroff & Strenger 2014), 
media inadvertently influences funding opportunities and interreligious solution models 
and, thereby, how certain social problems are framed (Liebmann 2018). One could argue 
that precisely due to the ‘banal securitization of Islam’, Muslim leaders have aligned 
themselves with the government and its various de-radicalisation initiatives, as taking 
an explicit opposition to extremism has become the only legitimate discourse (Kundnani 
2014: 14). Internationally, a recent strand of responses to assumed threats from ‘home 
grown terrorists’ has been to promote recognition of mainstream Islam as the valid identity 
within an official discourse of tolerance (ibid.: 65ff.). Now, the governance in, and of, media 
frames is particularly evident within the present seminar as a report on municipalities’ 
roles in counter-radicalisation measures shows how threat assessments of Kristiansand 
actually differ significantly from the threat assessments of other Norwegian municipalities 
investigated (cf. Lid et al. 2016). Notably, whereas Kristiansand for years has dealt with 
tangible security threats from the region’s considerable right-wing milieus, ‘Islamic 
extremism’ is of much less impact precisely in this part of the country (ibid.: 53). Ultimately, 
the inherent focus of the seminar does not mirror the concrete threat assessments of the 
region but, instead, conveys how radicalisation as a concept has come to connote Islam.
As the presenters, the convenor and the youth in the video disclose, Islam and Muslims 
constitute a point of reference that cannot be circumvented when reflecting on radicalisation 
as a phenomenon. One reason for using the term ‘radicalisation’ in public policy measures 
may actually be to avoid polarisation between Muslim and majority communities (Sedgwick 
2010: 493 in endnotes). In theory, the term ‘radicalisation’ facilitates public discussion of the 
problem of violent Islamism without using the words ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslim’ (ibid.), including 
generic forms of terrorism. Yet, the term – and its connotations – may actually come to 
establish the very idea that ‘Muslim’ and ‘radical’ are indeed synonymous. Corresponding 
to the point of George Lakoff (2014) that frames are in force whether one accepts or rejects 
them, Islam constitutes ‘the elephant’ in the interfaith room because even when presenters 
actively try to steer away from showcasing prejudices and deploying stereotypes on Muslims, 
they cannot escape them. On the contrary, they point to Muslims or events and objects that 
refer to Islam to conceptualise and concretise the essence of religious radicalisation.
One man’s dialogue, another man’s de-radicalisation
Through media and policy framings of radicalisation as inherently linked to Islam, 
the initially dialogic event unintendedly becomes intermingled with the trope ‘banal 
securitization of Islam’. As organised cultural encounters, interreligious events are based on 
the implicit assumption of an incompatibility that threatens the intended peaceful interaction 
between the dialogue partners if disagreements are not reduced (Malik 2013: 500), and 
thus, the existing religious, ethnic and cultural differences must be circumvented. In this 
Unauthentifiziert   | Heruntergeladen  28.10.19 15:40   UTC
395
sense, the very set-up of interreligious dialogues is prescribed to facilitate transformation, 
which inevitably involves governing dynamics. Whereas Muslims in this de-radicalisation 
seminar constitute the objects of tolerance, as Muslims are the ones being deliberated, the 
primarily non-Muslim audience is posited at the receiving end of the framing apparatus and 
handled as subjects of tolerance. As the very organisation of the event reproduces a notion 
of community that identifies Muslims as a social group to be governed, its inherent framings 
define and reinforce alleged problem factors that set Muslims apart from constitutional and 
civic order and therefore legitimise discourses and practices of guidance and tolerance as 
well as suspicion and control (Dornhof 2012: 388).11 Tolerance emerges as part of a frame that 
identifies both the capacity of tolerance and the tolerable with the attending high school 
students, marking Muslim candidates for an intolerable ferocity that, again, consolidates 
the dominance of the ethno-religious majority (cf. Brown 2008: 6). Clearly, the seminar and 
its inherent interreligious dialogue do not foot the respective religions on equal terms as the 
tolerated citizens, the Muslims, indirectly are marked as undesirable, deviant and marginal 
by virtue of constituting the tolerated party. Put differently, the seminar works as dialogue 
for the presenters but de-radicalisation for the audience.
Independently from the media framing of Muslims, another frame occurs due to the 
governing nature of FTL as a civil society association. As a means of addressing diversity, 
FTL applies dialogue between world religions as a particular visible frame, but media 
and policy frames become more evident through the ad hoc content of the seminar such 
as the speakers’ comments and the convenor’s entries and narrative transitions between 
speakers. This way, the evoked tropes, the ‘banal securitization of Islam’ and ‘Islamisation’, 
emanating from policy and media discourses illustrate the extent to which these frames 
shape society.
Conclusion
Through a micro-scale analysis of the organising of the de-radicalisation seminar Together 
against Radicalisation and Extremism held in 2015 in Kristiansand in Norway, the article has 
critically explored how the framing of radicalisation as inherently Islamic came to structure 
the interfaith seminar in a direction opposite to its intentions of stimulating cross-religious 
understanding and peaceful coexistence. In an event charged with benevolent intentions of 
reducing prejudices, the organisers, the convener, the experienced public speakers and the 
video-projected youth were unable to transcend the media and policy frames of Muslims 
as particularly prone to violence. The inability of these dedicated civil society members 
to discard inconspicuous perceptions of Muslims as prototypical extremists not only 
illustrates the governing and constraining dynamics of media and policy framings and how 
they are applied at the civic society level but also shows how media and policy framings 
come to structure a cultural encounter such as the one in question in a direction opposite 
to its intentions.
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Combining theories of media and policy framing (Entman 1993; Goffman 1974), the 
analysis pointed to how the seminar and its speakers posited Islam as an organising 
principle around which the intended unpacking of violent religious extremism’s generic 
entities came to revolve. Staged in a secular venue and convened in a setting of mutual 
intra- and interreligious awareness and proficiency, the seminar effectively works as an 
instrument of religious diversity management. Through such diversity management, 
boundaries around religion, ethnicity and culture – tacitly understood to collide with the 
hegemonic Christian-secular Norwegian culture – were effectively demarcated. Via the 
pursued tolerance, the seminar represents a merging of de-radicalisation and interfaith 
initiatives, which exemplifies a surging and mediatised European governance of religious 
diversity.
The merging produces a certain form of benign, inclusive religiosity concurrently with 
sustaining and reinforcing formations of severe power inequalities between ethno-religious 
minorities and majorities. The vague definitions inherent in the term ‘radicalisation’ 
combined with the ad hoc nature of interreligious – and other civil society – events pave 
the way for authorities’ capacity to ‘instrumentalise civil society organisations’ (Hayes & 
Kundnani 2018: 37). Thereby, authorities may turn the interfaith initiatives into measures 
of integration, security or foreign policy, which risk undermining the relative autonomy of 
the civil society.
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Notes
1. The work of Lid et al. (2016) constitutes an exception, but the report only focuses on the 
Norwegian municipalities’ role within de-radicalisation interventions.
2. These are the Norwegian Humanist Association, Catholic Church St. Ansgar, the 
Norwegian Church, Muslim Union in Agder, the Norwegian Sotozen Buddhist Order, 
the Adventists, the Methodist Church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
Kristiansand Free Church, the Quaker Society, Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat and Al-
Rahma Islamic Centre.
3. Original in Norwegian. 
4. The aspect of expertise is pivotal. In the context of ‘government by community’ (Amir-
Moazami 2011), dialogue initiatives primarily establish the partners involved in the 
exchanges as experts who mediate between concerns and interests (Dornhof 2012: 388).
5. In 2013, the government requested STL to prioritise interfaith projects that explicitly seek 
to counter an increase in ‘extreme religious attitudes’ within the citizenry (Brottveit, 
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Gresaker & Hoel 2015: 36). FTL has since then conducted annual de-radicalisation 
seminars on ‘religious extremism’ directed at local high school students.
6. All names have been changed for the sake of anonymity.
7. The number of practicing Jews in Norway is very low, and Anna was invited as a last-
minute substitute, although she is not a practicing Jew, which she emphasised several 
times.
8. Vidar Kleppe was a member of parliament and deputy leader of the Progress Party until 
he was suspended and left the party in 2001. In 2002, he (co)founded the Democrats 
Party – a national conservative political party without parliamentary representation. 
Since 2003, he has held office in the Vest-Agder county council and the Kristiansand 
municipal council. SIAN, established in Agder in 2008, has long been among the largest 
membership organisations of the anti-Muslim far-right.
9. ‘Je suis Charlie’ is a slogan and logo created by the French art director Joachim Roncin 
and adopted by supporters of freedom of speech following the attack in the French 
satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015 killing 12 people. Here, the 
convenor alludes to both this attack and the attacks in Copenhagen in February of the 
same year killing two people. 
10. Muslim civil society actors heavily criticized IRN in 2014, claiming that IRN was not 
determined enough in their dealings with ‘radicalised Muslims’. Furthermore, there 
was a crisis in the long-standing dialogue between IRN and other faith communities 
in 2013 and 2014, according to Norwegian media reports (Bangstad & Elgvin 2016: 10).
11. Whereas Sarah Dornhof (2012: 393) has noted how Christianity in Germany has merged 
into the cultural heritage while Islam remains alien to the secular conception of the 
national community, this certainly holds true in the south of Norway, which has a 
substantial Christian tradition (Repstad 2009).
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